

LINGUISTIC FEATURES OF ILLOCUTIONARY ACT IN PAREMIOLOGICAL SPEECH

Sindarova Dilshoda Nurmukhammatovna

Teacher of SamSIFL

Abstract: *The following thesis intends to reveal all linguistic aspects of illocutionary act in paremiological speech, its linguistic functions, position as well as gives detailed illustrations about delicate points of words in contexts.*

Key words: *speech acts, illocutionary, speaker, hearer, addressee, discourse, interaction, receipt.*

PAREMIOLOGIK NUTQDAGI ILLOKATSION HARAKATNING LINGVISTIK XUSUSIYATLARI.

Annotatsiya: *Quyidagi dissertatsiya paremiologik nutqdagi tilshunoslik harakatining barcha lingvistik jihatlarini, uning lingvistik vazifalarini, pozitsiyasini ochib berishga mo'ljallangan, shuningdek, kontekstdagi so'zlarning nozik nuqtalari haqida batafsil tasvirlar beradi.*

Kalit so'zlar: *nutq aktlari, ifodalovchi, so'zlovchi, tinglovchi, adresat, nutq, o'zaro ta'sir, qabul qiluvchi.*

The social-interactive view is that language comes out from acts of speaking or writing when someone utters something to someone else at a certain time in a certain place -- often as part of a longer discourse or conversation. It is mostly considered these acts of speaking and writing as **Speech acts** [1; Allan, Keith, 1986:42]. There is a clear assumption that Speaker implies to intercommunicate with Hearer. As it was widely recognized by Allan, the intention is automatic: it is Speaker's will to have a person in earshot recognize that Speaker wants him or her to receive the position of Hearer and therefore be an intended recipient of Speaker's message and accordingly, react to it. So, *when Kim hears Jane speaking in her sleep, he will not think she has a reflexive intention towards him, and as a result not to expect that she plans her utterance to have any effect on him* -- though she might deliberately keep him awake. There are a few of mental, emotional, and physical effects that speakers possibly wish to produce, e.g. persuading Perceiver to an idea, discouraging Hearer, alerting Hearer of danger, getting Hearer to do something by means of a suggestion, a hint, a request, or a command. [2; Bybee, Joan L, 1989:78] In the spoken average there is never more than one speaker per utterance;

however, two speakers may utter identical utterances in unison, or Speaker may speak on someone else's behalf. [3; Clark, Herbert H, 1992 :53] Co-authors generally take joint obligation for what is written but, normally, each writes only a part of the text. This plain dividing line with the number of hearers or readers Speaker may have for an audience. An addressee is someone who cannot reject the role of Hearer without serious affront to Speaker. Direct speech act is determined contextually -- by direction of gaze, pointing a finger, touching an arm, using a name, or on the basis of who spoke last; less commonly, the nature of the message will determine who is the intended addressee. Written account the change of addressee in the example and the nonspecific addressee .

Joan, Max bought me this beautiful ring for our anniversary, didn't you Max, you sweetie!

Congratulations, whoever came first!

In the example, Speaker uses an expressed performative clause to make a assure. Speaker could also have made the promise by uttering , in which the promise is not explicitly spelled out in the semantics of the verb but is inferred by means we examine later.

I promise to call Jo tomorrow.
I'll call Jo tomorrow. Hereby cannot illicitly be inserted between 'will' and 'promise' which confirms that 'promise' is not a performative verb. The modal *will* is used in its philosophy "predict" Meaning and is irrealis because it denotes an unactualized event, namely the future act of promising. The pattern established by *will* holds specifically for modal auxiliaries with performative verbs which actualize the illocutionary act. The modal must therefore be used in its base meaning, which is realis, the leave-taking and the informing is evasive:

I must hereby take my leave of you.
Civil wrong citizens should hereby be warned that they will be prosecuted.
I can hereby allow you to act as our agent from this moment.

The stem meaning of *can* and *could* is joined to the adjective *cunning* and north British dialect *canny*: "actor experience how and has the quality and ability, to do act A". In the example above, if 'can' means "have the power to" and 'hereby' means "in perfect this performative", then it effects an authorization. However, if 'I can hereby' means "using this fax from head-office makes it possible for me to", then it is not an dominance but a statement about a possible authorization.

I might hope to visit you next time I'm in town.
I might hereby authorize your property
I could hereby sentence you to ten years imprisonment.

Their categorization of 4,800 verbs into 600 categories from 24 types in eight groups was made (as it is by other scholars) on an intuitive basis in terms of semantic similarity. [4; Fillmore, Charles J, 1971: 273] makes a much more explicit semantic analysis of 270 speech act verbs, grouping them into 37 classes. E.g. her Promise class contains *promise, pledge, vow, swear, vouch for, and guarantee*.

**The present King of France is bald, because there is no King of France at present.*

**Jo regrets kissing Eric, because in fact she never kissed him in the first place.*

In order to notice the collaborative maxim of quality and sincerely utter *Linguistics is less rigorous than philosophy*, Speaker unit must believe that the proposition is true: all examples are contradictory because Speaker generally denies this necessary condition on his or her infelicitously uttering the sentence. They are all notably tentative which accounts for their use in polite contexts. The recognition of mood identifies the primary illocution in the utterance, but not Speaker's illocutionary point. It is often taken that performative clauses, in which the verb spells out the illocutionary point, express their illocutionary point right away [5; Harder, Peter, 1996:145] but the analysis of that example makes this impossible: the essential illocution of a performative clause is that of a asserting

I promise to go there tomorrow.

As in most actions, the interlocutors each have an agenda; and to carry out the plan, the illocutions within a discourse are ordered with respect to one another. The effect is to create coherent discourse in which Speaker upholds his or her obligations to Hearer. Future work on speech acts needs to account for the effort of individual speech acts to a discourse or text; and that leads into colloquial and/or discourse analysis. Very little work has been done on the contribution of the illocutions within utterances to the development of apprehension in written texts. Texts, whether spoken or written, display one or more of four perlocutionary functions according to [6; Lacoff, 1982:63-70] Social fundamental interaction predominates in what [7; Katz and Jarrold J, 1980:163] called phatic communion; informativeness act upon in academic texts; persuasiveness in election speeches; and entertainment in novels. But many texts combine some or all these functions in varied degrees to succeed in their communicative purpose. For instance, although an academic text is primarily informative, it also tries to influence readers to reach a definite point of view; it needs to be amusing enough to keep the reader's attraction; and most scholarly texts try to get the reader on side through social interactive techniques such as use of authorial *we* to reckon the reader. The effort of the illocutions of individual utterances to the understanding of topics and occurrence within texts is painfully in need of study.

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