THE EXTENSIVE FORM OF A GAME
Keywords:
Game theory, strategic form, extensive form, game tree, information set, bluffing, signaling, decision-makingAbstract
This article explores the two fundamental models of game theory — the strategic form and the extensive form. While the strategic form provides a compact mathematical representation of a game, it fails to capture crucial aspects of real-world interactions such as bluffing, signaling, and sequential decision-making. The extensive form, on the other hand, illustrates the game through a game tree, incorporating chance moves, information sets, and the temporal structure of decisions, thus offering a richer and more realistic model of strategic behavior.
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